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C00010 00003	1. The happiness theory leads benevolent people to try
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.require "memo.pub[let,jmc]" source;
.cb ON HAPPINESS


	Few ideas have caused as much unhappiness as the idea of happiness
itself.  I think that most people believe that they do what they do
because they think it will make them happy, and if the action doesn't
make the actor happy, then it was pointless.  This often leads the
person to try to analyze what constitutes happiness for himself,
and when the analysis fails, he finds all action pointless.  At this
point he usually either forgets the problem for a while or concocts
for himself some idea of what constitutes happiness whose hollowness
later returns to haunt him.  He is usually happier when he isn't
thinking about happiness but rather pursuing some goal he has somehow
adopted.

	In order to understand it better, consider the following
mathematical formulation of the idea of happiness and its pursuit.
A person has a sensation function %2input(t)%1 where ⊗t is time,
and happiness is defined by

!!1:	%2H = %A$  happi(input(t)) dt%1,

where the function ⊗happi gives the "instantaneous happiness".
Sometimes the integrand is multiplied by a damping factor
of the form %2e%5-at%1 that serves to discount the future.
According to this theory, the success of a life would be the
value of this integral, and it should be engraved on the
tombstones of the members of the society for point-count living.

	In my opinion, most utilitarian philosophers from Bentham
to Rawls are essentially adherents of this theory, and I don't
suppose I have refuted it just by making a joke about it in
the previous paragraph.
Moreover, the general form of the theory admits considerable
variation, because the instantaneous happiness function ⊗happi 
can be varied to account to give a variety of motivations
either as normative proposals or psychological theories.
I suppose that most rational people form the theory spontaneously;
I believe I did.

	Nevertheless, I believe the theory is wrong psychologically
in the sense that people's actions can't be explained by supposing
that they do what they think will make them happy.  It is also
wrong in the normative sense; there is no way of fixing the
function ⊗happi that in fact will lead to a moral and personally
satisfactory life.

	First, I would like to attack it as pyschological philosophy.
People are observed to pursue various goals.  Can we account for
their behavior by supposing that they are trying to maximize a
happiness function.  The most obvious counter-example is that of
a man pursuing a goal that will be realized only after his death.
This behavior is rather common, but many people refrain from it,
because they adhere to the happiness theory of their own motivations,
and this makes it seem irrational to pursue goals that will be
realized only after their deaths.  (Of course, one way out of the
difficulty is to believe in an after-life, in which case one can
imagine taking satisfaction in heaven with the achievement of the
goal.  It seems to me that the Christian religion played an
important role in  helping people rationalize such goals, and
this made it possible for Christian countries to form long
term purposes and implement them.  Unfortunately, the religion
seems to be mistaken, and this has weakened the ability of the
formerly Christian countries to form and pursue long range
goals).

	Fortunately, many people still pursue post-life goals, either
because they don't believe the happiness theory of their own motivations,
because they forget about it most of the time, or because they
can somehow rationalize their post-life goals as contributing
to their happiness.

	Let's look at some of the rationalizations of post-life
goals by adherents of the happiness theory.

	The second psychological objection to the happiness theory
is that people often reject illusions as happiness.  Suppose
I have somehow formulated the altruistic goal that my children's
college education be provided for in case I die prematurely, and
I implement this goal by buying an insurance policy that to my
surprise and pleasure turns out unexpectedly inexpensive.
Now suppose that
I accidentally come upon evidence that the insurance company
has put a provision in the policy that will allow them to avoid
paying it.  I do not regret having discovered this fact, even though
I would have been happier all my life had I not discovered it.
The simplest explanation is that my goal concerned the real world
and not the sequence of my perceptions.  Naturally, an empiricist
may be inclined to try to repair the theory that happiness is
a function of perceptions in various ways, but these ways all
seem rather strained.

	However, suppose we grant that goals involve the real
world as well as perceptions.  I might try to salvage the happiness
theory by making the integrand a function of the state of the
world-history and not just of input.  Even so repaired, the theory
is still wrong.

	There is simply too much evidence that people form goals
rather arbitrarily.
1. The happiness theory leads benevolent people to try
to optimize other people's happiness, which often results
in trying to control them rather than letting them do
what they want.

2. People want to have goals.  They want these goals to
have certain characteristics, e.g. they want to have
goals they regard as moral.

3. Many goals arise as metaphors but escape the control
of their causes.  This is ok.

4. A person's criteria for compromising among his long
terms goals depend on his physiological state.  Thus what
seems worthwhile in life as a whole is much affected by
fatigue or oxygen deficiency.  This effect is distinct
from the fact that physiological condition produces
short term goals.

5. The higher order goal criteria are higher order in
the logical sense of predicates applicable to predicates
and not necessarily in any moral sense.

6. True benevolence involves letting others do what
they actually want - subject to others' rights -
rather than optimizing their happiness in any sense.